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CORPORATIONS-EFFECT OF MERGER UPON APPARENT RIGHTS
OF STOCKHOLDERS UNDER PREFERRED STOCK CoNTRACTs-A period
of comparative business prosperity following an economic depression
is certain to stimulate schemes of corporate reorganization aimed at
the preferred stock contract, and particularly at adjustment or cancellation of unpaid dividends on cumulative preferred stock. ·When a
corporation having an outstanding issue of cumulative preferred stock
has survived a period of depressed earnings, it is likely to find itself
emerging into a more prosperous period burdened with preferred
dividend accumulations that would take years to satisfy from anticipated future earnings alone. Obviously, there is little reason for
optimism on the part of the owners of common stock if, according to
the usual rule,1 they must wait until the preferred stock contract is
satisfied before any of the expected future earnings can be distributed
to them. The common stockholders are interested in some means of
fulfilling the preferred stock contract other than by.payment of all the
dividends called for, which means either that all the preferred stockholders must consent to something less, or that some procedure must
be employed which will conclude the interests of the preferred stockholders without their consent or with the consent of less than all.
Apart from payment, there are two principal means of adjusting the
apparent priorities of all the preferred shareholders with less than their
unanimous consent. One of these methods involves amendment of the
corporate charter,2 and the other takes the form of merger, consolidaII FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §5296 (1931); 12 id., § 5447.
On the subject of the effect of charter amendments on preferred stock, see,
inter alia, Management Plans without Aid of Committees, REPORT OF S.E.C. REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, PART VII, pp. 109-197, 464-525 (1938); BERLE &
MEANS, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 208 et seq. (1932);
KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 200 et seq. (1941); Curra~, "Minority Stockholders
and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 MICH, L. REv. 743 (1934); Meck,
"Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV.
L. REV. 71 (1941); Becht, "The Power to Remove Accrued Dividends by Charter
Amendment," 40 CoL. L. REv. 633 (1940); Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and
1

2
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tion, or sale of corporate assets. It is the purpose of this comment to
examine the effect of merger upon some of the provisions of the preferred stock contract.
I

The power to merge depends entirely upon statute,3 and every case
relating to the impact of merger ,necessarily involves some statutory
construction. For purposes of illustration, use of the Delaware merger
statute seems appropriate because of the great number of corporations
organized in that state,4 because many of the leading cases in the field
concern Delaware corporations, and because the statute is typical of
those states which have general merger statutes: 5 The Delaware statute
authorizes merger of any two or more domestic corporations, and provides:
" •.• The directors, or a majority of them, of such corporations
as desire to consolidate or merge, may enter into an agreement
signed by them and under the corporate seals of the respective
corporations, prescribing the terms and conditions of consol-idation or merger, the mode of carrying the same into effect, ... as
well as the manner of converting the shares of each of the constituent corporations into shares of the consolidated corpora. • •.•"6
hons
. The statute further states that the agreement shall become effective upon approval of two-thirds of the total number of shares of
capital stock of each constituent corporation, and compliance with certain administrative provisions. The possible consequences of a literal
application of the statute are readily apparent.
In fitting the merger statute into the field of per~issible corporate
acts, the basic principle involved is that the corporate charter, of which
the corporation statutes are a part, 7 constitutes a contract between the
Amendments to Corporate Charters," 75 UNJv. PA. L. REv. 585 (1927); and
annotations, 6 A.L.R. 802 (1920), 6-7 A.L.R. 765 (1930), and 133 A.L.R. 653
(1941).
8
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS, rev. ed., § 289 (1946).
4
·
LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION (1937), traces the development of
popularity of incorporation under Delaware law.
15
S.E.C. REPORT ON REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 531, n,ote 19 (1938). The
REPORT lists thirty-three states as probably permitting merger without special legislative action. Id. 526.
6
,
DEL. REv. CoDE (1935), c. 65, § 2091. (Italics supplied.) An additional
provision, § 2091A of the code, expressly provides for merger of Delaware principals
with subsidiaries incorporated in Delaware or elsewhere [ Del. Laws (1937), c. 131,
§ 2], but this was held to add nothing to the power of Delaware corporations, as
concerns merger with a wholly-owned Delaware subsidiary. Federal United Corp. v.
Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 3 l 8, II A. ( 2d) 3 31 ( l 940).
·
7
13 AM. JuR., Corporations, § 73. In Delaware, this is expressly provided by
statute. Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 65, § 2II5.
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state and the corporation,8 between the corporation and the stockholders, and among the stockholders inter sese. 9 Therefore, a merger attempted in violation of the contract is at least voidable by one whose
rights thereunder are impaired without his consent. But what rights
does a stockholder have under the contract, and when may he be imid
to have waived or consented to their impairment? If a corporation
charter and certificates of stock issued under the charter provide that
each share of preferred stock shall be entitled to a 7 per cent cumulative preferred dividend, it would.seem that the preferred stockholder
has a contractual right to receive those dividends. If the charter and
stock certificate say that the corporation will pay the preferred stockholder in cash I ro per cent of the amount of the reduction in value of
his stock in the event of merger, that, too, would appear to be a contractual right. At least it is probable that those are rights which the
preferred shareholder in fact believes he is receiving when he purchases
his stock. But under the Delaware type of statute, such a stockholder
is likely to discover that he has failed to consider the effect of the provision authorizing a merger upon the "terms and conditions" and in
such "manner of converting the shares" as the directors may prescribe
and of which two-thirds of the stockholders may approve. On the
premise that the merger statute is a part of the charter and that the
charter is the measure of the stockholders' contractual rights, the courts
have regarded the effect of merger upon the apparent rights of the
stockholders as a question almost exclusively controlled by statutory
interpretation.
It is for this reason that Delaware corporations have found merger
an effective vehicle through which to eliminate preferred dividend
arrearages. In 1936, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Keller v.
Wilson & Co., lnc.,1° holding that a reserved power to change "special
rights of shares" 11 by charter amendment could not be used as a basis
for amending away accrued but unpaid preferred stock dividends.12Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).
On the tripartite contract concept of corporate charters, see Morris v. American
Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923).
10
21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936). See also, Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (1937).
11
Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 65, § 2058.
12
But this reserved power has been held to permit a corporation to issue new
prior preferred stock, making the old preferred and its accrued unpaid dividends
subordinate to the dividend preferences of the new issue. Shanik v. White Sewing
Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A. (2d) 831 (1941). Thus, by authorizing the
issue of a new preferred stock in exchange for the old preferred with arrearages, a
corporation may effectively, although indirectly, coerce the holders of the old preferred into converting their shares and surrendering their rights to unpaid dividends
by the simple expedient of paying dividends on the new stock to the exclusion of the
8

9
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Despite the sweeping "vested rights"' language of the Keller case,
four years later the same court, in Federal United Corp. v. Havender,13 held that the arrearages could be compounded by merger.1"' In
dismissing a bill to have the merger declared void, the court in the
Havender case said that the merger statute gave notice to "the average
intelligent mind" 15 that rights to accrued dividends were subject to adjustment in the event of merger. The statute had been in force since
the inception of the state's General Corporation Law, said the court,
and was written into every corporate c.narter, informing the stockholder
when he acquired his stock that his right to accrued dividends was
defeasible by merger.16
The harsh result of holding arrearage elimination to be a question
solely of corporate power 11 was softened only slightly by the ViceChancellor of Delaware in Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.18 Since the
H avender case had not raised the question of fairness,19 an attack on
that ground appeared to be the only course left open to the dissentient
stockholder. In the Porges case, a preferred stockholder contended that
a proposed merger was unfair to the point of "constructive fraud" because the allocation of converted shares under the merger agreement
would give the old common stockholders new stock with a book value
of at least $500,000 in exchange for old stock which was under water
old. Accord: Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N.E. (2d) 502 (1940);
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 ~.E. (2d) 127 (1938). But cf. Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
13
24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. (2d) 331 (1940).
14
The courts and writers have gone to great lengths in attempting to distinguish
the Havender case from the Keller case. The explanation of Professor Meck, that
the distinction lies solely in the extent of corporate power reserved under the different
statutory provisions relating to amendment and merger, appears to be quite acc~ptable.
Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine,"
55 HARV. L. REv. 71 ( I 941). Still, from the point of corporate practice resulting
from the two decisions, there is much force in the statement of Judge Biggs in
Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944 at
951, that "Havender broke Keller's back."
15 Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318 at 334, II A. (2d)
• 3 3 I ( I 940) •
.
16 Judging from the court's analysis of the Keller case; a different result might
have been reached had the corporation been organized before the enactment of the
statute. Id. at 333. The court avoided the problem of retroactivity of'a later statute
expressly providing for mergers of principals with subsidiaries (supra, note 6) by
holding it to be merely declaratory cif the general power to merge under the earlier
statute. Id. at 332.
17 Meck, "Ac~rued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1941).
18
(Del. Ch. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 148.
19 The plaintiff's generous concession that the merger involved in the Havender
case was "fair and equitable" may have been his greatest mistake. See Dodd, "Fair
and Equitable Recapitalizations( 55 HARV. L. REV. 780 at 801 (1942).
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to the extent of nearly $2,000,000. While the court acknowledged
that "the exercise of the statutory right of merger is always subject to
nullification for fraud," it said that when "constructive fraud" is
charged "the unfairness must be of such character and so clearly
demonstrated as to impel the conclusion that it emanates from acts of
bad faith, or a reckless indifference as to the rights.of others interested,
rather than from an honest error in judgment." 20 Viewing all the provisions of the proposed merger, the court found no fraud to fit its definition and dismissed the bill.
2

This view, that arrearage elimination by merger is valid unless
conceived in fraud or bad faith, has been adopted wholesale by several
federal courts under an application of the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins. 21 In fact, it has been carried even farther than the state
courts have gone. In Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp.,2 2 the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that arrearage
destruction by merger was valid under Delaware law even though
the merger was illusory in substance, the defendant corporation having
created a subsidiary for the express purpose of merging with it. The
whole arrangement was frankly a "paper" merger designed solely to
effect a recapitalization, yet the court said: "A court of the United
States bound by the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is powerless to
afford aid to the stockholder unless reclassification reaches that degree
of unfairness where it amounts to a cancellation of the preferred stockholders' accumulated unpaid dividends without adequate compensation
therefor under the law, either by way of a share in the equity of the
surviving corporation or by the payment of money under section 6 r
of the General Corporation Law. 28 At such a point a court of the
United States might grant injunctive relief under the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 24 But the court also noted that "at such a
point the courts of Delaware might well hold that a merger was void
because of constructive fraud." 25 That observation would appear to
indicate that any constitutional limit!ltion on the power to merge would
be equivalent to the equitable limitation ascribed to the Porges case in
the case of fraud.
The most recent case involving recapitalization by merger of Dela2032 A. (2d) 148 at 151 (1943).
21 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
22 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944.
28 This is the provision providing for appraisal and payment of the value of
shares of stockholders who dissent from merger. Del. Rev. Code (1935) c. 65,
§ 2093.
24 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943)"136 F. (2d) 944 at 953.
25
Supra, note 16.
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ware corporations is Langfelder v. [.fniversal Laboratories, lnc.,2° also'
decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The merger involved
in the Langfelder case was the same merger which had been ~pheld by
the Vice-Chancellor of Delaware in Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp./' but
the plaintiff in the Langfelder case sued under a different theory.28
Under a charter provision stating that preferred shareholders would be
paid accumulated dividends plus I IO per cent of the amount of "reduction in value" of such stock resulting from reduction of the capital
stock of the corporation, the plaintiff, a preferred stockholder, sued
for breach of contract. His argument was that his stock had been
"reduced in value" by 45 dollars per share, inasmuch as each share
of IOO dollars par value preferred stock in the old corporation was
converted by the merger into new stock of a total stated and par value
of only 55 dollars, and that the charter gave him a right to receive
r IO per cent of the amount of this reduction, plus about 90 dollars
per share in dividend arrearages. The court was not impressed. Regarding the case as governed solely by state law under the doctrine of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,2° the court concluded that even had the
charter provided for payment of the amount of reduction in the express
event of merger, and that a debtor-creditor relationship should immediately arise on such reduction, the merger statute would still permit
the corporation to evade such provisions. "Allowing the doctrine [ of
the Havender case] the fullest scope we think it must be conceded that
any and all rights inherent in any class of stock could be obliterated by
merger unless the terms of the merger agreement were so unfair,
inequitable, or fraudulent as to meet the bar of the Porges decision
or that set up in this court's opinion in Hottenstein." 30 Instead of attempting to construe the charter provision as not contemplating the
exchange of stock in a merger arrangement within the meaning of the
word "reduction," the court assumed that the provision was intended to
include merger cases and further that it was intended to create a debtorcreditor relationship between the corporation and the preferred stockholders in the event of such a reduction. But, argued the court, until
the reduction took place, the stockholders were not debtors but stockholders; until the reduction their rights were purely contractual rights
26

(C.C.A. 3d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 804.
Supra, note 18.
28 And he apparently thought it was a sound theory. Before bringing the suit
into a •federal court, the plaintiff had carried the case through three New York state
courts. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the two lower court decisions and
sustained a dismissal of the suit by the trial court as a proper exercise of the discretion
to decline jurisdiction of controversies involving foreign corporations. Langfelder
v. Universal Laboratories, Inc., 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E. (2d) 550 (1944).
29
Supra, note 2 I.
so (C.C.A. 3d, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 804 at 807.
27
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inherent in stock ownership and hence subject to conversion by merger
under the doctrine of Federal United Corp. v. Havender. 31 According to the court's analysis, there could be no debt until there was a
reduction and no reduction until there was a merger, but since merger
destroyed the contract to create a debt in the event of reduction the
plaintiff was not yet a creditor when the reduction occurred. But why
should not the merger, the reduction, and the creation of the debt be
regarded as occurring simultaneously? Theoretically, the very instant
the merger becomes effective there is a reduction in the value of the
preferred stock, which, according to the charter, creates a debt in
favor of the stockholder. And yet, in some unexplained way, the court
held that the merger converted the rights of the stockholder qua stockholder before it reduced the value of his stock. Unless the court regarded the reduction in value as occurring only upon a physical
exchange of the stock certificates, or unless it considered the fact of
merger to have detonated a chain reaction which a:ffected the rights of
the stockholders qua stockholders before it reached the point of reducing the value of their stock, the decision is somewhat difficult to
justify analytically. An Illinois appellate court decision 32 antedating
both the Havender and Keller cases reached the same result as that of
the Langfelder case, under a somewhat similar charter provision,33 by
holding the provision to be in derogation of the merger statute and absolutely void. But the court in the Langfelder case did not purport to
place its decision on that ground,34 preferring instead to rely on an
application of the Havender doctrine and the Erie R. Co. case.
The Langfelder decision is a striking illustration of the extent to which
corporate action in destruction of apparent rights of minority stockholders can be carried through the device of recapitalization by illusory
merger under the Delaware statute.

3
This is not to say that the same result would necessarily be reached
under other statutes. In New Jersey, for example, under a statute
81

Supra, note 13.
Jones v. St. Louis Structural Steel Co., 267 Ill. App. 576 (1932).
83
"The consolidation or merger of such company at any time, or from time to
time with any other company or companies shall not be regarded or construed to be a
dissolution of said corporation within the meaning hereof but no such merger shall
in any way impair the rights of the preferred stock." Id. at 280.
34
The court referred to the Illinois decision, however. (C.C.A. 3d, 1947)
163 F. (2d) 804 at 808. It also held that the defendant corporation was not
estopped by the charter provision promising to pay in the event of reduction in value
of the preferred stock, because such an estoppel would be in derogation of the merger
statute. But the court did not in terms hold the charter provision void, but only
ineffective because it had been changed by the merger before it could create a debt
according to its terms.
12

88
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much like that of Delaware but differing in some respects,85 preferred
shareholders seem to be regarded as having a "vested right" in any
earned surplus of the corporation which cannot be destroyed by any
plan contemplating elimination of preferred dividend arrearages, at
least where the common stockholders would benefit.86 This limitation
is termed one of "fairness." 87 In the absence of an earned surplus,
however, New Jersey appears willing to go along with Delaware to
the extent of permitting merger to destroy accumulated unpaid preferred ·stock dividends.88 The New Jersey concept of fairness is seemingly based upon the idea that the shareholders are entitled to fair
exchange value of their shares and an exchange carrying relative
equality in the new company,3° and appears to bear no necessary
relation to the Delaware concept, which is defined in terms of the
absence of bad faith.4 ° From the point of view of, the shareholder
whose apparent rights are taken from him by merger, neither •of these
limitations seems adequate; from the point of view of the majority
of stockholders who approve the plan, any further limitation would
seem oppressive. One writer has suggested,41 along the line of the
New Jersey view, that no merger so destructive of apparent rights
should be upheld unless the preferred stockholder receives the substantial equivalent of what he gives up, or unless justified by corporate
need. Another suggestion has been that the merger should be held
unfair as against preferred stockholders unless it provides for maintaining their absolute priority over the common stockholders,42 a standard
N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § 14:12-2.
Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stocks: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. REv. 71 at 95 et seq. (1941).
37
Id. at 96.
88
•
Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., IOI N.J. Eq. 543, 138 A. 772 (1927),
105 N.J. Eq. 621, 149 A. 36 (1930); affd. per curiam, 107 N.J. Eq. 528, 153 A.
402 (1931).
89
Outwater v. Public Service Corp. of New Jersey, 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A.
729 (1938); affd. per curiam, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 146 A. 916 (1929). The case is
discussed in Lattin, "Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to
Majority Stockholders," 30 MICH. L. REv. 645 at 663 (1932).
40
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., (Del. Ch. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 148. See also
Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 418, applying the
same view to a charter amendment case. Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., (N.Y.
Co. S.Ct. 1943) 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 33, applies the same _test under the New York
merger statute.
41
Latty, "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination,"
29 VA. L. REv. I (1942). S.E.C. REPORT ON REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Part VII
(1938), points out that corporate need would justify the usual' m(,rger provision in
relatively few cases.
42
Dodd, "Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 (1942).
Professor Dodd points to Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E.
906 (1939); and Buckley v. Cuba1' American Sugar Co., 12.9 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A.
85

86
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comparable to that applied to corporate reorganization plans under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.43
In general, however, such suggestions have not been judicially accepted, and the courts have been disinclined to limit the power to
merge. Of course, if the provisions of this merger are not authorized.
by statute, they are invalid under the ordinary principles of ultra vires
acts.4 4 As indicated by the cases discussed above, the same is true if the.
merger is fraudulent. If, however, the provisions of the merger plan
can be construed to fall within the merger statute as a "term or condition of merger" or a "manner of converting the shares," and are not
outlawed by other statutory prohibitions, the plan is likely to be upheld. There seems to be no public policy, at least in Delaware, against
the elimination by merger of accrued unpaid and undeclared dividends,45 nor, according to the Lang/elder case, against the conversion of
other rights apparently given by charter. Other jurisdictions share
the same view.46 So long as the statutes are construed as being a part
of the stockholders' contract, the constitutional prohibition against
state impairment of contract obligations 47 can apparently afford no
protection if the state has reserved the power to alter and amend the
corporation laws. 48 This is certainly ti-ue where the merger statute
was in force before the corporation was organized.49 The dictum in
Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corporation 50 indicates that the
federal due process clause 51 might afford relief in a proper case, but the
point at which that clause may be invoked to defeat a merger has ap(2d) 820 (1940), as supporting his view. Id. at 817. Both the cited cases involved
charter amendments and not mergers.
43 II U.S.C. (1946) § 621. The leading case on the bankruptcy test of fairness
is Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. l (1939).
It may be noted that in the Forges cases, the plaintiff complained that common stockholders, whose equity of ownership in the corporation had no book value whatever,
were allowed under the merger plan to participate in the ownership of the corporation resulting from the merger. The fact that the plan was upheld as fair indicates
that Delaware, at least does not consider the absolute priority test of fairness under the
Bankruptcy Act applicable to merger cases.
44
William B. Riker & Son Co. v. United Drug Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 580, 82 A.
930 (1912).
45 See the remarks of Hulbert, J., in In re Community Power & Light Co., (D.C.
N.Y. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 901 at 915.
.
46
New York: Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., (N.Y. Co. S.Ct. 1943) 44
N.Y.S. (2d) 33; Pennsylvania: Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., (D.C; Pa.
1941) 42 F. Supp. 432. •
47 U.S. Const., Art. I, § IO.
48 Tnistees of D<!rtmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518
(1819).
49 Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 763.
50
(C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 944.
51
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV,§ 1.
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parently not yet been reached. Due process objections have been raised
in a few cases,52 but have been disposed of on the theory that the dissenter had notice that his rights were subject to change by merger
and that the statutory right to demand appraisal and payment of the
value of his spares provides an adequate remedy if he does not approve
of the merger.
The fact that appraisal statutes usually give the dissenter an election to demand appraisal of his shares and payment of their "fair
value" or "fair market value" in the event of merger 58 probably accounts for much of the leniency with which merger plans have been
treated. On the other hand, the fact that the remedy of appraisal and
payment is not ordinarily available 54 for the protection of stockholders
who dissent from corporate readjustment by charter amendment is at
least one reason why the courts have regarded the charter amendment
cases with much closer scrutiny. In the merger cases, the idea that
the appraisal statute affords adequate relief to the dissenting stockholder often dominates the courts' reasoning. In many instances, the
appraisal statute is said to be the exclusive remedy if the merger is not
unauthorized, unfair or fraudulent, 55 which js only another way of
expressing the conclusion reached in the Havender case and succeeding
cases. It has often been argued that although appraisal statutes are in law
deemed to provide an adequate remedy, they do not provide an adequate remedy in fact. 56 The argument proceeds on the theory that the
stockholder frequently does not know that he has an appraisal remedy
until he has waited too long to be able to invoke the statute's protection, 57 that the procedure is expensive, time-consuming, and compli52 Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., (C.C.A. 3d, 1943) 136 F. (2d}
944 (merger}; Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1941) 42 F.
Supp. 432 (merger); Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1943) 52
F. Supp. 763 (charter amendment}.
53
S.E.C. REPORT ON REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 593 (1938).
54
Ibid.
55
The cases are collected in 87 A.L.R. 597 (1933); and 162 A.L.R. 1237
(1946).
56
S.E.C. REPORT ON REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Part VII, 590 et seq.
( 1938} presents an excellent factual study of the inadequacies of statutory appraisal.
See also Robinson, "Dissenting Shareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the
Valuation of Their Shares," 32 CoL. L. REv. 60 (1932); -Lattin, "Remedies of
Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes," 45 HARV, L. REv. 233 (1931);
Levy, "Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment," 15 CoRN.
L.Q. 420 (1930}; Weiner, "Payment of Dissenting Stockholders," 27 CoL. L. REv.
547 (1927).
57
•
It should be noted that no proxy solicitation under the Securities and Exchange
Act can be made without furnishing the person being solicited a "proxy statement"
containing, inter alia, an outline of the rights of appraisal of dissenters and the statutory
procedure required to be followed in order to perfect such rights. S.E.C. Regulation
X-14, Schedule 14 A-2.
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cated, and that the stockholder is driven. to an election between
acceptance of the merger provisions or pursuing the statutory appraisal
remedy and is thus forced to accept the former as the lesser of two evils.
The argument is appealing, but is based upon the assumption that the
.dissenting stockholder is entitled to more protection than the appraisal
statute gives. Whether this assumption be true is largely a question of
policy.

4
Nearly every merger involves competing policy considerations.
Undoubtedly there are strong reasons of policy in support of the proposition that every stockholder should be permitted to retain the absolute
preferences which he in fact thought he was receiving when he purchased his stock. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons for holding that a corporation should be permitted to reorganize and throw off
the shackles of preferred stock dividend arrearages and similar burdens
if that is the course approved by a large majority of the corporate
owners affected. It is clear that both propositions cannot prevail. When
a means is afforded to dissenters to withdraw from the enterprise under
an appraisal statute, the courts have been strongly disposed to uphold
the action of the majority.
There are several reasons for such a conclusion. In the first place,
the appraisal statutes, while not free from objection, do provide
some relief. That such relief is available to one party to a disputed
merger is at least a factor weighing in favor of the other. In the absence
of some such compensatory element, the court would have to provide a
substitute,~8 or be forced to hold the dissenter's right to be either absolute or nonexistent. The statutory appraisal procedure has been regarded as giving a sufficiently adequate remedy to justify the court
in forcing the dissenter to elect between that remedy and maintaining
his readjusted status of ownership in the new corporation. The second
principal reason which has led the courts to uphold adjustments of
stockholder preferences by merger is found in the broad phraseology of
the merger statutes. The liberal wording of these statutes permits
liberal interpretation and makes it easy for the court, if it is disposed
to do so, to say that the dissenter had notice that his rights were subject to alteration by merger. Theoretically, the same reasoning would
apply even though there were no appraisal statute, but the existence
of an appraisal remedy makes the result appear less harsh. There are
other, more obscure reasons for upholding the power of the corporate
8
~ A nonstatutory right of appraisal has been allowed in a few cases. See Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 67 A. 912 (1907); Winfree v.
Riverside Cotton Mills Co., 113 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912); Nice Ball Bearing
Co. v. Mortgage Building & Loan Assn., 310 Pa. 560, 166 A. 239 (1933).
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majority to dictate fair terms of merger. One such reason is a policy in
favor of encouraging business and industry, and hence of encouraging
corporate methods. The very existence of a merger statute is indicative of a policy of the state favoring the corporate majority or other
proportion of ownership which the statute prescribes for approval of
mergers. Further, it is frequently difficult to determine whether a
dissenting stockholder is complaining in perfect good faith or whether
he is merely ,a '"professional privateer" 59 seeking to obstruct a healthy
recapitalization merely to exploit the nuisance value of his stock. Certainly the court should have little sympathy for the latter.
These considerations give some indication of the reasons prompting a judicial inclination to look with disfavor upon a minority stockholder who seeks to block majority action under the merger statutes.
The desire to uphold a fair merger may at times lead a court to arrive
at its conclusion by using premises of questionable soundness, as in the
Langfelder case. Although the logic of that decision is far from flawless, and although a more forthright approach to the problem presented
might have called for holding that the charter provision there in question was void because it attempted to derogate from the merger statute,60 the result announced does not necessarily require that the case be
criticized. If the considerations behind the decision are sound, there is
good reason to support its conclusion.
However the court may have reached its decision, the Lang/elder
case makes it clear that so long as a preferred stockholder must rely
solely on his status as a preferred stockholder 61 he has no absolute
preferences, no matter how strongly the charter may be worded. That
proportion of the stockholders to which the merger statute has given
the power to approve the terms, conditions, and manner of converting
the shares, owes no duty to the minority except to act in good faith
and without fraud. 62 A liberally-phrased merger statute, the Havender
59
Vice-Chancellor Lane's description of the late Clarence Venner in General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 88 N.J. Eq. 237, 102 A. 252 (1917).
60
As in Jones v. St. Louis Structural Steel Co., 267 Ill. App. 576 (1932).
61
If the corporation has actually declared a dividend before the merger is approved, but has not paid that dividend, the stockholder may well claim that he was a
creditor of the corporation before the merger, as well as a stockholder, and that no
merger plan can lawfully destroy that debt.
·
62
With this statement should be compared the result reached in the recent case
of Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., (C.C.A. 3d, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 36, where the
court held that majority stockholders could not redeem preferred stock if such
redemption resulted in profit to the majority stockholders at the expense of the minority,
even though such redemption complied with every charter and statutory provision
relating to such redemption, i:he "fiduciary relationship" being found to exist at least
where the redemption was attempted as part of a plan for liquidating the corporation.
The court did not feel bound by state law, which would have seemed to dictate a
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case, and the Erie R . .Co. case are sufficient to foreclose all ·other
apparent rights m those jurisdictions. which choose to follow 68 the
Delaware view.
Charles M. Soller, S.Ed.

contrary result, because the facts were held to be sui generis. The case is discussed
in 46 M1cH. L. REv. 1061 (1948).
,
68 It is certain that the Erie R. Co. case does not require a federal court to
follow state court decisions if the merger violates the due process or contract clauses.
In Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 at 561, 62 S.Ct. 398 (1942), the court
said "When this Court is asked to invalidate a state statute upon the ground that it
impairs the obligation of a contract, the existence of the contract and the nature and
extent of its obligation become federal questions for the purpose of determining
whether they are within the scope and meaning of the Federal Constitution, and
for such purposes .finality cannot be accorded to the views of a state court." No mention
was made of the Erie R. Co. case,

